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Abstract Neural spikes are an evolutionarily ancient
innovation that remains nature’s unique mechanism for
rapid, long distance information transfer. It is now known
that neural spikes sub serve a wide variety of functions and
essentially all of the basic questions about the communi-
cation role of spikes have been answered. Current efforts
focus on the neural communication of probabilities and
utility values involved in decision making. Signiﬁcant
progress is being made, but many framing issues remain.
One basic problem is that the metaphor of a neural code
suggests a communication network rather than a recurrent
computational system like the real brain. We propose
studying the various manifestations of neural spike sig-
naling as adaptations that optimize a utility function called
ecological expected utility.
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Introduction and background
Acontinuing theme incomputational neuroscience hasbeen
the search for ‘‘the neural code’’. In this paper, I will suggest
that this is not a well formed question and has given rise to a
fair amount of needless confusion. Neural spikes are an
evolutionary ancient innovation that remains nature’s
unique mechanism for rapid long distance information
transfer (Meech and Mackie 2007). Other communication
mechanisms are either much slower (e.g., hormones) or
extremely local (e.g., gap junctions). It is now clear that
neural spikes sub serve a wide variety of functions. Rather
than trying to restate well established facts about neural
spikes, this paper will develop a new and broader view. For
background, we will rely on a few standard books and three
fairly recent surveys by de Charms and Zador (2000), by
Kreiman (2004), and by Gollisch (2009).
We will continue the tradition of examining neural
signaling from the information processing perspective
(Feldman 2006, Chap. 2), backgrounding the underlying
biochemistry. Most research is focused, as it should be, on
speciﬁc systems, but there are also important regularities in
neural representation and communication. Current research
is extending these general studies to decision making, but
is unfortunately also falling prey to the myth of a unique
neural code.
One major barrier to understanding ‘‘the neural code’’ is
that the term itself can be misleading. First of all, using
‘‘the’’ presupposes that there is just one mode of neural
signaling, which is known to be false. In addition, one
standard meaning of a code is a ﬁxed representation of
information that is independent of the sender, receiver, and
mechanisms of transmission (Kreiman 2004). The tradi-
tional example was Morse code, but perhaps the best
known current example is the ASCII code used in com-
puting. In ASCII, the lowercase ‘‘a’’ is always 1100001 and
uppercase ‘‘A’’ is always 1000001, etc. Of course, genetic
DNA is a code in this sense, although much more complex
than ASCII. Neural spike signals are used in several ways
in living systems, but this kind of context-free code is not,
and could not be, one of them, as will be shown in the
section ‘‘Spikes in single neuron communication’’. We will
use the phrase neural signaling to refer to the rapid, long
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Another, quite distinct, use of the term ‘‘neural code’’
relates neural signaling to Shannon information theory,
often called coding theory. The standard book ‘‘Spikes:
Exploring the Neural Code’’ by (Reike et al. 1997) makes
no mention at all of ASCII like codes. Codes in informa-
tion theory have no symbolic meaning and this is a much
better model for neural signals. The Rieke et al. book
remains the most thorough treatment of neural signaling
from the coding theory perspective, containing theoretical
and experimental treatments of rate coding, decoding,
quantity of information, and reliability. For the more
recent, utility-based studies, we will rely mainly on the
collection of articles in (Glimcher 2009).
Spikes are an evolutionarily ancient mechanism that is
largely preserved. Quoting from John Allman (2000), who
knows vastly more than I do about the brain:
Action potentials and voltage-gated sodium channels
are present in jellyﬁsh, which are the simplest
organisms to possess nervous systems. The commu-
nication among neurons via action potentials and its
underlying mechanism, the voltage-gated sodium
channel, were essential for the development of ner-
vous systems and without nervous systems complex
animals could not exist.
Much of the mechanism behind neural spikes goes back
even earlier in time (Meech and Mackie 2007; Katz 2007).
Unsurprisingly, the earliest function of spiking neurons is
to provide a signal for coordinated muscle action as in the
swimming of the jellyﬁsh. This kind of one-shot direct
action remains one of the principal functions of neural
spikes. Nature is quite conservative—once a winning
design evolves it is reused and adapted. There is no reason
to expect the range of variation in function for neural
spikes to be less diverse than that of forelimbs, which have
become arms, legs, wings, or ﬁns. Spiking neurons are
evolutionarily much older than forelimbs.
Because of the underlying chemistry, all neural spikes
are of the same size and duration. The basic method of
neural information transfer is, and needs to be, by labeled
lines. Most of the information conveyed by a sensory
neural spike train comes from the origin of the signal.
Every patch of your skin contains a variety of specialized
sensing neurons, each conveying a speciﬁc message.
Similarly, the result of motor control signaling is largely
determined by which muscle ﬁbers are targeted. The other
available degree of freedom is timing; there is a wide range
of variation in the axonal conduction time of neural spikes.
Nature has evolved a rich variety of mechanisms for
exploiting absolute and relative time. Of course, all of the
variants of neural signaling were selected for their
evolutionary ﬁtness and this becomes important later in the
article.
An additional deﬁnitional problem was that the idea of a
code suggests some deterministic representation. As
recently as 2000, a survey of research on the Neural Code
in the Annual Review of Neuroscience (de Charms and
Zador 2000) had essentially no mention of probability and
utility. The zeitgeist has changed radically and Kreiman’s
(2004) review and subsequent articles are largely framed in
probabilistic terms. The volume by Glimcher (2009)
remains the best introduction to these developments, often
called ‘‘neuroeconomics’’. We will look at this in some
detail in later sections.
From our information processing perspective, the crucial
issue is effective signals. We are interested in when a
neuron or neural system evokes an action or makes a
decision. From our purposes these are essentially the same
and will be referred to as action/decision. Obviously
enough, an individual neural spike is an action and can also
be viewed as a (metaphorical) decision by the neuron to
ﬁre. For larger neural circuits, we still want to focus on
information (coded as spikes) that (eventually) leads to a
decision to do one thing rather than another. If there is no
choice, there is no effective information. This becomes
important when we try to analyze what function is sup-
ported by some spiking pattern.
Most research is focused, as it should be, on the speciﬁc
systems, but there are some useful insights about neural
representation and communication in general. The goal
here is to consider the mechanisms of rapid, long distance
communication in nervous systems. If we try to include the
content of all the messages, we would need to explain
everything about the brain. If we focus on the form of
messages conveyed by neural spikes, a relatively clear and
coherent picture emerges. We will focus on the information
conveyed directly by spikes and not review the signiﬁcant
modulatory effects of chemical signals delivered by neural
activity. Other important related topics that will not be
covered in detail include spike generation, development,
and learning.
In addition to information processing, the other orga-
nizing principle for this study is resource limitations. The
most obvious resource limitation for neural action/decision
is time. Many actions need to be fast even if that means
sacriﬁcing some accuracy. Some neural systems evolved to
meet remarkable relative timing constraints, much shorter
than spike intervals. A second crucial resource is energy;
neural ﬁring is metabolically expensive (Atwell and
Laughlin 2001; Lennie 2003) and brains evolved to con-
serve energy while meeting performance requirements. The
three factors of accuracy, timing, and resources are the core
of a utility function that constrains neural computation. For
advanced social animals like ourselves, there are a number
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explore tradeoff (Cohen et al. 2007), communication, and
social cognition. Neural signaling evolved to serve all these
functions, but the range of basic mechanisms involved is
rather restricted.
Spikes in single neuron communication
Although all behavior involves neural circuits, it is useful
to ﬁrst consider the role of neural spikes in the communi-
cation from a single neuron to another or to an effector cell.
As always, our discussion will elide the biophysical and
chemical details and focus on the information processing
perspective. As discussed above, one ancient and important
use of spikes is when a single spike evokes an action/
decision. Single spike activity is surprisingly important in
complex brains, including ours. As (Reike et al. 1997,p .
17) point out, spiking is temporally sparse—often about
one spike per neuron for a salient event.
In some cases, the temporally leading spikes can be
shown to directly determine human behavior. This is called
‘‘spike wave theory’’ (Rousselet et al. 2007) or sometimes a
‘‘latency code’’. In a path breaking series of experiments
the Thorpe group (Kirchner and Thorpe 2006) has shown
that complex visual decisions can be made in about the
time that it takes for the ﬁrst spikes from a visual input to
reach the brain area involved. The standard task is to push a
left button if a complex scene contains any picture of an
animal and a right button if not. The decision is detectable
as right or left motor cortex activity in 150 ms, which is
very close to the cumulative signaling and transmission
delays involved. The Rousselet paper suggests (p. 1255)
that the system can make the binary decision without actual
recognition—using top down priming to condition the
network to choose between two competing collections of
criteria features.
A related ﬁnding is computationally modeled by
(Serre et al. 2007). In these studies, people are shown a
very wide range of visual scenes at a rate of seven
images per second. Subjects have brief experiences of
recognition for each scene although there is no time for
eye movements. The authors are able to model this
behavior with a simple biologically motivated hierarchi-
cal feed-forward connectionist network, trained on half
the sample images.
The spike wave story also suggests an important point
about ﬁring patterns in neural populations. At every step in
a perceptual task there are many neurons ﬁring, but most of
this is the encoding of competing potential action/deci-
sions—the code is basically disjunctive not conjunctive
(Jazayeri and Movshon 2006). This will be discussed in the
section ‘‘Population codes’’.
We should also discuss why it is not feasible for one
neuron to send an abstract symbol (as in Morse or ASCII
code) to another as a spike pattern. There are several
related considerations from neural computation. We know
experimentally that the ﬁring of sensory (e.g., visual)
neurons is a function of several stimulus variables, often
intensity, position, velocity, orientation, color, etc. It would
take a rather long message to convey all this as an ASCII
like code and the ﬁring rates are much too slow for this,
even ignoring the stochastic nature of neural spikes. Even
if such a message were somehow encoded and sent to the
next level, it would require an elaborate computation to
decode it and combine it with the symbolic messages of
neighboring cells and then build a new symbolic message
for the subsequent levels. This is what we do with lan-
guage, but nothing at all like this occurs at the individual
neuron level.
The most common use of neural signaling is to indicate
the strength of some event, where the strength can code a
combination of the intensity of a multidimensional event
and some function of probability. Since all spikes are the
same size, the strength of the signal must be encoded in the
number or frequency of spikes. There are, of course, syn-
aptic weights but these encode the strength of connection,
not the signal. The conventional story is that the strength of
a neural spike signal is conveyed by spike discharge fre-
quency and everyone agrees that this is often the case. But
we also now know that there is more time dependence than
just spike frequency involved.
There is another terminological problem involving the
role of spike timing in neural communication. There are at
least three different versions of what synchrony might
mean for neural signaling. There is no question that the
relative timing of spikes arriving at a receiving site (syn-
apse, dendrite, cell, etc.) can have a profound effect on the
response (Kara and Reid 2003) and therefore timing is
certainly relevant. Obviously enough, spikes that are tem-
porally distant do not sum. There are also much more
delicate timing interactions involved in the echolocation
systems of bats, owls, etc. and also in LTP (long term
potentiation) and STDP (spike timing dependent plastic-
ity), all of which are discussed brieﬂy in the next section.
A second timing question is whether the inter-spike
interval of a single neural spike train conveys more useful
information than just the ﬁring rate. Because the base ﬁring
rate is often low, a single spike can be a rare event and
therefore convey more than one bit of information. But the
main area of contention has been whether there is signiﬁ-
cant additional information conveyed by the detailed tim-
ing of a spike train, beyond its average frequency. Spike
trains are known to be stochastic, but if we assume that the
distribution is known, two or three spikes can provide a
fairly good estimate of the underlying parameter and thus
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this controversy in some detail; the conclusion is that very
little if any useful information is conveyed by the phase
structure of a single pulse train. This is not important in any
case, because essentially all neural computation involves
inputs from multiple sources.
A third distinct timing issue involves hypothesized
periodic synchronous ﬁring patterns as an organizing
principle for conceptual binding; this will be discussed at
the end of the following section.
Spikes in neural circuits
Neurons never work in isolation; all behavior is mediated
by speciﬁc circuits, from the contraction of the hydra to
human speech. In higher animals, there are several levels of
redundancy in these circuits and this is deeply connected to
spike-based signaling. As is well known, the ﬁring of an
individual neuron is inherently probabilistic and so reliable
communication requires several parallel channels. In some
cases there are quite delicate timing constraints between
signals on coordinated channels. But we will ﬁrst discuss
circuits where the timing requirement is just that the spikes
are sufﬁcient close in space and time to have their effects
combine chemically.
Although some local circuits (e.g., in the retina) use gap
junctions, most are mediated by neural spikes. These local
computations are almost never considered part of the
‘‘neural code’’ and this is another ﬂaw in the standard
formulation. The Dayan and Abbott book (2001) and the
Gerstner and Kistler book (2002) have good treatments.
The most basic circuits involve competition, cooperation or
the combination of both. The paradigmatic example of
competition is mutual inhibition; this has two major effects
on theories of neural signaling. Mutual inhibition is what
allows a neural population with competing activation pat-
terns to come to a speciﬁc action/decision; there does need
to be a homunculus decider. Competing circuits play an
important role in neuroeconomics and will be discussed in
the section ‘‘Probability, utility, and ﬁtness’’. Inhibition
also allows for redundant back-up circuits to be in place in
case of damage to the primary circuit for some function,
this is known technically as ‘‘release from inhibition’’
(Snyder and Sinex 2002).
Cooperation between input signal streams also has many
realizations. The most basic is the use of multiple pathways
for greater reliability and dynamic range. Another impor-
tant use of coordinated signaling is in hyper-acuity. As was
mentioned earlier, the spike signal from sensory (e.g.,
visual) neurons encodes the strength of match to a broad,
multi-dimensional, receptive ﬁeld. Cooperating signals
allow for the sensing of differences beyond the
discrimination of the input receptors. As a toy example, the
coincident ﬁring of a cell that detected values in the range
[1–10] with one sensitive to values [8–16] signals the much
tighter range [8–10]. This coarse coding circuit mechanism
can be seen as a way of extending the representational
power of neural ﬁring. This well established neural
mechanism of coding the strength of a multi-dimensional
signal is another barrier to postulating a simple readable
neural code.
So far, we have focused on the immediate use of neural
spikes for action/decision. However, there are also impor-
tant indirect effects, studied under the names ‘‘spreading
activation’’ and ‘‘priming’’. Intuitively, spreading activa-
tion lies behind the fact that your thoughts will often shift
among loosely related ideas without any conscious action.
The brain is very richly connected and activation of one
thought provides collateral activation to ones that are
conceptually linked.
It is widely believed that a general best-ﬁt process
involving both competition and cooperation is the funda-
mental process underlying recognition in vision, language,
etc. Given two competing analyses of an image (e.g.,
Necker Cube) or a sentence, we normally settle on one and
do not notice the other. It is difﬁcult to exactly prove this
theory, but it is consistent with a great deal of evidence.
Several of the ideas just described can be seen in the
classical experiment of (Tanenhaus et al. 1979).
Subjects were asked to decide quickly whether letters
ﬂashed on a screen formed an English word. It was already
well known that responses could be improved by ‘‘prim-
ing’’, presenting a clue slightly before the test—either
visually or auditorially. For example, hearing the word
‘‘rose’’ makes people faster to indicate that the text
‘‘ﬂower’’ is an English word. In this experiment, subjects
heard sentences with a misleading word sense like ‘‘They
all rose’’ where the target word is not semantically related
to the sound clue. The results depended entirely on the
relative timing of the sound and image stimuli.
If the sound ‘‘rose’’ in the sentence above was timed to
be only slightly (\200 ms) before the test image, it still had
a priming effect on a word (ﬂower) that was related to a
unintended meaning of the sound that was never even
noticed by the subject. This is generally agreed to indicate
that there is pre-attentive parallel activation of all the
words consistent with a heard sound. With a somewhat
longer interval between the sound clue and the target
image, the priming effect disappears and there is even a
slight slowing from the neutral case. The hypothesized
underlying neural circuitry is modeled in Fig. 1.
The priming link between the noun ‘‘rose’’ and ‘‘ﬂower’’
is modeled as arising from the semantic relation that a rose
is a type of ﬂower. The triangular node models a local 2/3
circuit (Carpenter and Grossberg 1987) hypothesized to
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between the two senses of rose is diagrammed as a dashed
line with circular tips. In general, this kind of cooperative/
competitive architecture underlies a wide range of theo-
retical and experimental work on neural representation.
Again, the communication and settling of such networks is
not usually considered as part of ‘‘the neural code’’. More
generally, the spiking behavior of receiving neurons is also
a function of their internal state, which is yet another
reason why there is not a ﬁxed neural code.
We have discussed the circuit of Fig. 1 as local, but it
actually involves brain areas for sound, image, and con-
ceptual information. This is not unusual; almost all
behavior uses multiple brain areas in complex interactions.
For example, there are many more feedback connections
from primary visual cortex to the lateral geniculate than the
feed-forward links that are usually studied. In general, a
major problem with the metaphor of the neural code is that
it suggests a communication channel rather than a recurrent
computational system.
Time sensitive computations
Now we consider the time sensitive interactions. All neural
communication is constrained by the time constants of the
underlying chemistry, but there are some mechanisms that
have tighter bounds and are generally called coincidence
detection. For example, the circuits that process visual
motion rely on the coincidence of a current input with a
signal from cells that responded to a similar input earlier in
time at a nearby location. This encodes evidence for spe-
ciﬁc motion and it is why we see the discrete frames of ﬁlm
or TV as continuous motion. At the extreme end, the con-
duction time of spikes along axons is used with coincidence
to support very ﬁne distinctions in the arrival time of sound
at the two ears, mostly notably in owls. Owls and bats make
distinctions that correspond to timing differences at the ten
microsecond level—much faster than neural switching
times. Similar ﬁne timing distinctions occur in dolphins,
electric ﬁsh, etc. (Carr 1993); this is another example of the
use of spike signaling that cannot be called a code.
There is now a great deal known about the chemical
details on the timing sensitivity of post-synaptic events.
Timing ﬁt is crucial in a variety of ways, including LTP
(Long Term Potentiation, Gerstner et al. 1997) and STDP
(spike timing dependent plasticity; Bender et al. 2006; Iz-
hikevich 2007), but development and learning are beyond
the scope of this review.
The variable binding problem
Another area of considerable research and controversy
explores the possibility that separate coordinated phases of
neural spiking play a central role in the ‘‘binding problem’’.
The basic and easier binding problem concerns how we can
coherently see a bouncing red ball and a blue book given
that these properties are computed in separate brain areas.
The harder, variable binding, problem involves how we
remember and draw inferences from complex relations
(Barrett et al. 2008). For example, the sentence ‘‘John gave
the book to Dick and the red thing to Jane’’ automatically
leads to inferences about who has what (Shastri 2001).
Computational models of these processes are easy in con-
ventional programming, but no one has a convincing story
of how the brain achieves this.
The most popular and thoroughly studied neural model
of variable binding is based on the idea of synchronous
neural ﬁring patterns. Suppose that (somehow) the pattern
of activity for storing facts about objects was divided into
some small number (*8) of phase periods. Then all the
properties of the ball could be active in phase 3 and those
of the book in phase 5. When our sample sentence was
heard, the system would just add the new ownership facts
to the appropriate phase. Such a system is computationally
feasible and has been extensively discussed (Barrett et al.
2008). But despite some suggestive early experimental
ﬁndings, there is good evidence (Shadlen and Movshon
1999) that this is not the mechanism that the brain employs.
Population codes
Another terminological confusion arises in the use of
‘‘population codes’’ or ‘‘distributed representations’’. In the
Fig. 1 Model circuit for cross-modal priming (from Feldman 2006,
p. 90)
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resentations were basically punctuate with a ‘‘grandmother
cell’’ (Gross 2002; Bowers 2009) for each element of
interest or basically holographic (with each item repre-
sented by a pattern involving all the units in a large pop-
ulation). It has been known for decades (Feldman 1988)
that neither extreme could be computationally feasible for
the neural systems of nature.
Having just one neuron coding an element of interest
(concept) is impossible for several reasons. The most
obvious is that the known death of cells would cause
concepts to disappear. Also, the ﬁring of individual cells is
stochastic and would not be a reliable representation.
Computationally, it is easy to see that there are not nearly
enough neurons in the brain to capture all the possible
combinations of shapes, sizes, colors, etc. that we recog-
nize, let alone all the non-visual concepts. In fact, the pure
grandmother cell story has always been a straw man—
using a small number (*10) cells per concept would
overcome all these difﬁculties.
The holographic alternative is more attractive because it
is studied with the techniques of statistical mechanics. But
it is equally implausible. This is easy to see informally and
was established technically at least as early as (Willshaw
et al. 1969). Suppose that we want to represent some set of
concepts (e.g., English words) as a pattern of activity over
some number N (say 10,000,000) neurons. The key prob-
lem is cross-talk: if multiple words are simultaneously
active, how can we avoid interference among their
respective patterns. Willshaw showed that the best answer
is to have each concept represented by the activity of only
about logN units, which would be about 24 neurons in our
example. There are many other computational problems
with holographic models (Feldman 1988); for example if a
concept required a pattern over all N units, how would that
concept combine with other concepts or be transmitted to
other brain regions.
There is now a wide range of converging experimental
evidence (Bowers 2009; Olshausen and Field 1996; Vinje
and Gallant 2000; Purushothaman and Bradley 2005;
Quiroga et al. 2008a, b) showing that neural coding relies
on the behavior of a modest number (tens to hundreds) of
units. There is also overlap—the same neuron is often
involved in the representation of different items. For var-
ious reasons, not all of them technical, some people con-
tinue to refer to these sparse representations as ‘‘population
codes’’. An equivalent, and much more appropriate, char-
acterization would be redundant circuits.
One reason for the early suggestions proposing holo-
graphic codes is that, in many brain areas, a large fraction
of the neurons ﬁre in response to a relevant event. What
could they all be doing if not jointly coding that event? We
have already encountered the basic answer—there are
many possible interpretations of an isolated stimulus
(whether sensory or deeper). For the required rapid
response, it is optimal to consider the possibilities in par-
allel. In other words, the population ﬁring pattern is basi-
cally disjunctive, not conjunctive. Of course, not all
interpretations are equally likely and the population ﬁring
pattern can be viewed as encoding a probability distribu-
tion over the possible causes of the input (Barlow 2001;
Jazayeri and Movshon 2006).
A related terminological problem involves two distinct
uses of the term ‘‘sparse’’. As described above, the more
common usage refers to the fact that the neural represen-
tation of some item (e.g., a sound or an image) is carried by
a small fraction of the population of neurons in the relevant
neural area. But the term is also used (e.g., in the Kreiman
(2004) survey) to refer to the fact that the ﬁring of neural
spikes is sparse in time. Rates greater than 100 spikes/
second are unusual and there are systems with much slower
base rates. Neural communication is sparse in both time
and unit count and there are the usual metabolic pressures
that require this (Lennie 2003).
In summary, there is now a broad consensus on neural
spike signaling. There are a number of specialized struc-
tures involving delicate timing and the relative time of
spike arrival is important for plasticity. But the main
mechanism for spike signaling is frequency coding in
speciﬁc circuits of moderate redundancy. Current research
on ‘‘the neural code’’ is focused on how neural systems
deal with information and decisions under uncertainty.
Probability, utility, and ﬁtness
Although people are not perfect utility maximizers, there is
no question that much of human behavior is describable in
terms of probabilities and utilities. In recent years, this has
given rise to a renewed interest in ‘‘the neural code’’ for
decision making. The hypothesis is that there are general
mechanisms of representing probabilities and utilities and
associated decision rules. Unfortunately, there are indica-
tions of a new round of confused reasoning based on the
metaphor of the neural code and the communication
channel model of neural computation.
Noise is inherent both in our perception of the world and
in the chemistry of neural ﬁring. So any full explanation of
neural spikes will need to be probabilistic in some way.
This is generally accepted and, in addition, almost all
treatments include explicit prior probability estimates and
are therefore Bayesian. Further, some information and
decisions are more important than others so utility theory
must play an important role. There is a great deal of elegant
and informative work on theoretical and experimental
Bayesian modeling of neural communication and decision
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developments is part of the Neuroeconomics effort. The
(Glimcher 2009) collection has introductory articles on all
aspects of neurally based utility research.
Much of the work in neuroeconomics focuses on the
relation between animal (usually human) decision making
and possible neural substrates. This can be seen as an
extension of the earlier search for ‘‘the neural code’’ dis-
cussed in the sections on ‘‘Introduction and background’’,
‘‘Spikes in single neuron communication’’, ‘‘Spikes in
neural circuits’’, ‘‘Population codes’’ of this article. The
underlying belief is that there is some universal encoding
of the phenomenon. As with the earlier efforts, this entails
the risk of oversimplifying an operation, here decision
making, which has many manifestations at multiple levels
in all animals. For example, Paul Glimcher (2009, p. 508),
an unquestioned leader in Neuroeconomics, presents what
seems to be a dictum ex cathedra that ‘‘utility is ordinal’’.
Ordinal utility is preference without quantitative norms and
this is indeed much easier to assess in people. But animals
(including people) are constantly making multidimensional
choices and it would be impossible to do this without some
calibration of the relative strengths of all competing drives.
Experimentally, there are already results suggesting that
both ordinal and cardinal utilities are neurally encoded
(Pine et al. 2009; Platt and Padoa-Schioppa 2009, p. 448).
More importantly, the whole idea of claiming universality
from general reasoning or from one constrained experiment
is misguided.
But the Neuroeconomics effort is producing some
valuable insights into the possible neural processing of
probabilities and utilities. Bayesian posterior probabilities
have a simple relation to numerical (cardinal) utilities in a
single trial decision based on passive observation. The
expected utility of each choice is just the sum of the
probability, under that choice, of each possible outcome
weighted by the utility of that outcome. A standard
example is an animal choosing between two possible
unknown food sources, which it believes have different
probabilities of having two kinds of food. The expected
value of each potential source is the just the sum of the
values of the two food types, weighted by the probability of
ﬁnding each at that source. It turns out that even simple
animals come fairly close to optimal foraging strategies in
rather complex situations (Kamil et al. 1987). No one
believes that, e.g., insects, have explicit neural represen-
tation of expected utilities—effective foraging is an evo-
lutionary requirement (Parker 2006).
This is our ﬁrst direct encounter with the topic of ‘‘EEU
and the functions of neural spike signaling’’ of this article:
Ecological Expected Utility (EEU). The central insight of
Neuroeconomics is that the notion of ‘‘maximizing
expected utility’’ from economics is a powerful tool for
helping to understand neural computation. I suggest that
expected utility (EU) does provide an appropriate criterion
for modeling neural communication and computation, but
that a much richer and more subtle notion of utility, which
could be called ‘‘ecological utility’’, is needed.
In its most general form, this can be seen as a formal-
ization of the core biological idea of evolutionary ﬁtness.
As the great biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1900–
1975) famously stated ‘‘Nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of evolution’’. Animals are effective
foragers, because lineages that were not efﬁcient lost out to
competitors (McDermott et al. 2008). Much of the current
work on ‘‘the neural code’’ for utility and decisions
attempts to internalize representation and computation to
speciﬁc dedicated mechanisms. As in the earlier work,
seeking a ‘‘code’’ masks the inherently recurrent nature of
neural computing. A prototypical experiment studies
monkeys on one highly constrained task and makes a
mathematical model of the neural signals in one pathway.
Essentially all of these studies are strictly feed forward.
The survey by Knill and Pouget (2004) discusses several
computational neural models of uncertainty.
As soon as we include any active information gathering
strategy, the simple link between posterior probability and
expected utility breaks down. The main source of uncer-
tainty for animal decisions is not noise, but limited
observability. We usually do not have access to all of the
information that might be helpful in making an action/
decision. It is obviously better to gain information about
something that is more important to you. Again, this has
been the subject of extensive research in decision theory as
the ‘‘value of information’’ (Feldman and Sproul 1977;
Behrens et al. 2007). One important application of these
ideas to neural systems is in the study of information
gathering saccades (voluntary eye movements) and covert
attention. This will be discussed in the next section; the
main point here is that the utility function that must be
maximized in animals is much more complex than that of a
visual discrimination task.
EEU and the functions of neural spike signaling
We are now in a position to characterize the various known
functions of neural spikes and the roles they play in
behavior. From the EEU perspective, the basic question
concerns what kind of action/decision is supported by the
various spiking disciplines. Let’s start from the two
extremes. At the low end, there are reﬂexes and also a
number of behaviors that are triggered by a single spike,
either in isolation or as the ﬁrst spike (or wave of spikes)
from some stimulus. At the other extreme consider a major
life decision, like whether to accept a job offer. This kind
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123of binary action/decision usually requires an extended
period of active information gathering, often involving
considerable travel and time. These two extremes are often
described as Type 1 and Type 2 decisions (Kahneman
2003). As we will now show, there is actually a continuum
of action/decision processes involving varying amounts of
processing and information gathering.
One of the most productive techniques of cognitive
psychology involves studying people’s eye movements as
they execute behaviors. These eye-movement studies in
psychology pre-suppose that saccade planning is central to
optimal behavior. Obviously enough, where you look has a
much stronger effect on the information gained than any
details of subsequent processing (Yarbus 1967).
We are constantly making large and small decisions.
Every act of perception involves decisions, for example
disambiguating words as in the ‘‘rose’’ example of Fig. 1.
There is an enormous range of neural decision making,
with a vast array of different information gathering and
evaluating strategies. For concreteness, we will focus on
overt (saccades) and covert visual attention. As is well
known, people make three or four saccades per second and
each of these is goal driven action/decision. The recent
survey by Gollish (Gollisch 2009) is largely concerned
with neural signaling in early vision, taking overt and
covert attention seriously. There are a number of well
known effects of saccades on the visual signals transmitted
from the retina. During saccades there is signal suppres-
sion. Also ‘‘efference copy’’ provides the visual system
with a prediction of the saccade target and this is used to
prime that area. There is some shift in receptive ﬁelds
towards the target and this helps maintain coherence. More
surprisingly some (rabbit) retinal cells seem to switch
polarity (from ON to OFF) shortly after a saccade.
We do know a fair amount about the brain circuits that
plan saccades (and covert attention choices), but taking this
seriously requires explicitly modeling active perception. It
is perfectly possible to technically treat the choice of where
to next saccade as an ‘‘expected value of information’’
computation in utility theory (Torralba et al. 2006; Bro-
dersen et al. 2008). Torralba et al. model the choice of
saccade targets as Bayesian optimization combining local
feature information with global measurements suggesting
the general scene type. Interestingly, the model (and peo-
ple) does not need to know the general scene type to take
advantage of it. The Torralba paper includes detailed
comparison of scan patterns of the subjects and the model.
Again, the metaphor of a neural code just does not ﬁt.
This is not to dismiss the search for common mecha-
nisms. Even within the restricted feed-forward paradigm, it
is possible to suggest some possible general methods of
neural decision making. The (Gold and Shadlen 2007)
review article presents an extremely clear description of the
economic and neural background and many of the central
issues within the framework of simple sensory-motor tasks.
This is the best current introduction to the ﬁeld and totally
avoids the notion of a ‘‘neural code’’ although the idea of
decision variables plays a crucial role in their treatment.
Another interesting hypothesis comes from the Ganguli
et al. (2008) model of a study of attention and distractors in
the Lateral IntraParietal visual area LIP. Monkeys were
trained to make a saccade after a delay to the position of
the ring target that had a gap. On half the trials, a distractor
ring was ﬂashed during the delay. Attention, as measured
by improved contrast sensitivity, would be split between
the remembered saccade target and the distractor location.
The main ﬁnding is that the time for the sensitivity
enhancement to equalize between the two targets was
almost constant for each animal, independent of location
and of the base ﬁring rate of the neurons involved. The
paper includes an elaborate sparse coding model, but the
main proposal does not depend strongly on the details.
They suggest that the time to recover from a distractor
should be constant and needs to be a system (rather than a
local) property of the LIP network, because units differ in
their local dynamics. There could be a general architecture
that supports this functionality.
More generally, there are a number of subtleties
involved in deﬁning an ecologically appropriate notion of
utility. Evolutionary selection for ﬁtness guarantees that an
animal will not be too incompetent. Of course, selection
does not operate only on individuals so species survival
may well depend on actions that are not, by any direct
measure, optimal for the individual.
Even within one individual, the expected utility to be
maximized should be amortized over life experience,
including adaptation and learning. Further, even within one
behavioral episode, the optimal behavior is often rather
more complex than the current industry standard ‘‘Bayes-
ian Brain’’ story would suggest. As we saw above, looking
for general optimality in a single feed-forward perceptual
discrimination task has the character of looking for the lost
ring under the streetlight.
Summary
Neural spikes are an evolutionary ancient innovation that
remains nature’s exclusive mechanism for rapid long dis-
tance information transfer. There is no unique ‘‘neural
code’, but the number of spike-based communication
techniques is limited. From our perspective there are not so
many qualitatively different functional roles played by
neural spikes and each of these is best understood as
optimizing some EEU requirement. Each of these
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solving different information processing problems.
Ecological Expected Utility provides a unifying theme
for the communication functions sub-served by neural
spikes. EEU is determined by evolutionary ﬁtness of the
organism’s genome. It cannot be computed directly and is
not static over time, but it is what nature optimizes. By
keeping this explicitly in mind, we can come to a better
understanding of neural signaling and brain function.
Again obviously, animals often need to act before taking
time to fully consider all their options and seek additional
input. This can also be formalized within a utility theory
framework and some work along these lines has been done
in AI (at least) under the title ‘‘anytime planning’’ (Li-
khachev et al. 2008). The need for rapid, approximately
optimal, actions appears to have everything to do with the
neural coding. In fact, we can do fairly well by assuming
that neural spike signaling evolved to do as little as pos-
sible for each task.
The minimal neural action/decision is the reﬂex, which
can be monosynaptic. Even reﬂexes are conditioned by top
down activation; neural systems are never just passive. The
next level of complexity is multistep spike wave signaling,
as discussed in the section ‘‘Spikes in single neuron com-
munication’’; some pre-speciﬁed action/decisions can be
chosen by the temporally ﬁrst of competing spike signals.
The third level of complexity involves feedback loops.
These can be local as in lateral inhibition or across brain
regions as evidenced by the ubiquitous bidirectional con-
nections between levels. Neural loops inherently involve
settling time and therefore slower decisions. Loops also
entail that the signals on a given pathway change over time.
All of the mechanisms discussed above are passive; they
do not take into account the animals own actions to gain
information. In the previous section we reviewed some of
the most basic information gathering strategies, overt and
covert visual attention. But of course there are many others
involving bodily movement, active exploration, language,
etc. To be meaningful, any neural signals from perception
must be interpreted with respect to the context in which
they are received, again eliminating the possibility of a
ﬁxed neural code.
Neural spikes are a restricted mechanism, but it’s the
only one we’ve got for rapid long distance signaling.
Spikes are limited in speed, accuracy, reliability, and
bandwidth. There is no unique neural code, but instead a
wonderful collection of mechanisms that exploit neural
signaling for a remarkable set of functions. The current
focus on studying the general semantic content of neural
signals is an essential component of understanding the
brain, but labeling this effort as a search for ‘‘the neural
code’’ remains a profoundly bad idea.
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